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1. Introduction
Kosal Ly
    Economic theories suggest that increasing information exposure about firms should 
lower its cost of equity capital. These theoretical relationships are developed with the notions 
that information reduces a firm's expected cost of equity capital by reducing investors' 
estimation risks (Barry and Brown 1985, 1986; Coles and Loewenstein 1988; Mein and Bawa 
1976; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007); reducing adverse selection component of 
information asymmetry and increasing liquidity of firm's shares (Amihud and Mendelson 
1986, 1988; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Leuz and Wysocki 
2006; Verrecchia 2001); enlarging investor bases and improving risk sharing (Merton 1987); 
and reducing information risks (Easley and O'Hara 2004). 
    In general, empirical studies on the link between information environment and cost of 
equity capital can be carried out by two approaches. 
    On the one hand, direct link approach research attempts to link information (e.g., the 
number of financial analysts) to the cost of equity capital estimates. It empirically investigates 
the link between the cost of equity capital estimate, which is dependent variable, and proxy for 
information environment, which is independent variable. Although this approach enables 
researchers to document an empirical ink between information and cost of equity capital, it 
does not explicitly answer one important aspect, which is also of interest. That is, even though
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wee can say, for example, more information about firms reduces its cost of equity capital; we 
don't know whether this documented result is driven by which, mediating factors. This is due 
to the fact that there exist various theoretical models establishing a link between information 
and cost of equity capital based on various factors. 
    On the other hand, indirect link approach research, which investigates an association 
between information environment (e.g., the number of financial analysts) and proxies of 
variables expected to be theoretically related with cost of equity capital (e.g., bid-ask spread), 
often draw implications on a firm's expected cost of equity capital. Yet, none has explicitly 
conducted a study on a later link, between those variables and expected cost of equity capital. 
    This paper investigates the relationship between financial analysts and cost of equity 
capital using full indirect approach. Particularly, we examine the relationship between financial 
analysts and firm's expected cost of equity capital, using adverse-selection/market liquidity 
based theoretical model. Under this model, a link between information and cost of equity 
capital is motivated by the notion that investors with better information can take advantage of 
other investors who have less information, commonly referred to as adverse selection 
component of information asymmetry. These models argue that adverse selection component 
of information asymmetry introduces high transaction costs and/or illiquidity of firm shares, 
and further suggest that firms with those characteristics have high cost of equity capital. In 
other words, high transaction cost and illiquidity of firm shares reduce total returns that 
investors will receive. Investors therefore will demand high returns when investing in firm 
shares with those characteristics, which in turn imply a high cost of equity capital to firms. 
    Since financial analysts act as information intermediaries, who play an important role in 
disseminating information, it is argued that many financial analysts following a firm represent 
the high firm's information exposures for investors, It therefore has a relationship with a 
firm's cost of equity capital. For instance, Easley and O'1-lara (2004, p.1578) state in an 
implication of their theoretical model that "attracting an active analyst following for a company 
can also reduce a company's cost of capital, at least to the extent that analysts provide credible 
information about the company."
i
I
i
2. Literature Reviews
    Financial analysts act as information intermediaries, who play an important role in 
disseminating firm's information. They collect information about firms they follow from public
-66-
Financial Analysts'Coverage and Cost of Equity Capital
and private sources, evaluate its current performance, make forecasts about its future 
prospects, and recommend that investors buy, hold or sell its shares. 
    Overall, there are evidences that financial analysts add value in the capital market (Healy 
and Palepu 2001). Financial analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations, for example, 
affect share prices (Francis and Soffer 1997; Lys and Sohn 1990). In addition, financial 
analysts are more superiors to time-series models in forecasting earnings. Their forecasts of 
earnings consequently are relatively more accurate because they are, presumably in part, able 
to incorporate more timely economy and firms news into their forecasts than are time-series 
models (Brown et al. 1987). Market participants consequently rely on financial analyst 
forecasts as a surrogate for the market's unobservable arnings expectations (Kothari 2001). 
    Chung et al. (1995) study the relationship between the numbers of financial analysts 
following a firm and bid-ask spread. Unexpectedly, this paper finds that average bid-ask 
spreads increase in the numbers of financial analyst followings. The authors attribute this 
positive relationship to analysts choosing to follow firms with high information asymmetries. 
Investors for those firms therefore interpret more analysts following a firm as a signal of 
higher information asymmetry and set correspondingly higher spread. Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996), however, document opposite result. They show that increase in the 
number of financial analysts following a firm is associated with a decrease in spreads. Yohn 
(1998) examines analysts following and spreads, but only in the days before and after an 
earnings announcement, and finds that the average daily spreads around the earnings 
announcement are decreasing in the number of financial analysts following a firm. Roulstone 
(2003) states that, from a public information perspective, the number of financial analysts 
proxy for the amount of information available regarding a firm's value. Roulstone finds that 
analysts following have a negative and significant association with spreads.
3. Research Methodology
3.1 Hypothesis Statements 
    In this study, first, we employ relative bid-ask spread as a proxy for adverse selection 
component of information asymmetry. Bid-ask spread is commonly thought to measure 
adverse selection explicitly (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). The reason is that bid-ask spread 
addresses adverse selection problem originated from transacting in firms shares in the 
presence of asymmetrically informed investors. Less information asymmetry implies less
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adverse selection which, in turn, implies smaller bid-ask spread. In order words, the greater 
the heterogeneity of information among investors, the wider the bid-ask spreads. Second, we 
use the numbers of earnings estimates made by sell-side financial analysts since it represents 
for the numbers of active financial analysts following a firm, and thus as a proxy for firms 
information environment. Finally, we estimate a firm's ex-ante implied cost of equity capital 
based on reverse-engineering residual income valuation model. 
    We state our question of interest and its respective hypotheses as of the following: 
Question: Do firms with higher numbers of financial analysts have lower expected cost of equity 
       capital? 
Hypothesis 1: The number offinancial analysts' earnings estimates i negatively associated with 
           bid- ask spread. 
Hypothesis 2: Bid-ask spread is positively associated with expected cost of equity capital.
3.2 Variable Measurements and Regression Models 
3.2.1 The number of financial analysts' earnings estimates is negatively associated with 
bid- ask spread (H1) 
    3.2.1.1 Dependent variable 
    The bid-ask spread (SPREAD) is the average relative spread (i.e., absolute spread 
divided by the average of bid and ask) for December 2008. 
    3.2.1.2 Independent variable 
   The numbers of earnings estimates made by financial analysts (ANF) can be used as a 
substitute for the numbers of financial analysts following a firm. ANF for a financial year 2008 
is thus the numbers of financial analysts' earnings estimates for that year, forecasted at the 
end of the year. 
    3.2.1.3 Control variables 
    Existing researches suggest that bid-ask spread is positively related to dispersion in 
analysts' earnings forecasts (FDISP); negatively related to firm size(MV), percentage of share 
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free float (FLOAT), and average share price (P) (e.g., see Leuz and Verrecchia 
and Venkatesh (1988)).
(2000); Chiang
     3.2.1.4 Regression model 
    Hypothesis 1 can be examined through a multiple inear egression model expressed by
the following equation, hereafter referred to as equation e (El). 
      log(SPREAD,) _ /30 +/3, log(ANF; )+/3z log(FDISP; )+/33 log(MV; )
                  +/341og(FLOAT,)+(351og(P;)+e; (El) 
3.2.2 Bid-ask spread is positively associated with expected cost of equity capital (H2) 
    3.2.2.1 Independent variable 
    Defined above, SPREAD however serves instead as independent variable inhypothesis 
2, while it serves as dependent variable inhypothesis 1. 
    3.2.2.2 Dependent variable 
    This paper employs accounting-based methods to estimate expected cost of equity 
capital, rather than theory-based methods (e.g., CAPM) (". With regards to accounting-based 
method, prior researches attempting to compare the performance of each implied cost of 
equity model document that cost of equity capital implied from the residual income valuation 
model outperforms that from the abnormal earnings growth valuation model (e.g., Gode and 
Mohanram (2003); Ahn et al. (2008)). We implemented finite horizon version of residual 
income model, based on empirical implementation of Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
(2001), and we limit our analysis tofirms with December fiscal year-end since the majority of
US firms have December fiscal year-end and so that he implied cost of equity capital are 
estimated under the same circumstance. Cost of equity capital for the year 2008 is estimated 
on its fiscal year-ending date. Its algebraic equation can be written as of the following: 
          a (F
raet -rocs)xFbpst.1 (Froer-rots)xFbps,-i (Froeio-rocs)xFbpsos P~ =Fbps~+~= -+I - - + 
         t-1 (1 + rocs)' 1-s (1 + rocs)` rots x (1 + rcrs)os
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Where: 
     rGLS 
   P„ 
   Fbps, 
   Feps, 
    Froe,
Financial Analysts'
(Froe, - r.         x Fbps,_,
Coverage and Cost of Equity Capital
= Implied cost of equity capital based on GUS method 
= Price of share at year t = 0 
= Forecasted book value of equity per share at year t 
= Forecasted earnings per share at year t 
= Forecasted return on equity capital at year t where Froe, _ 
 Feps,/Fbps,_ 
= Forecasted Residual income (RI)
i
    Above equation is tenth-degree polynomial equation with respect to cost of equity capital 
rGLS. In general, the nth-degree polynomial equation has exactly n solutions. Using 
Mathematica software, we identified ten unique solutions for rGSS. The formulas are not 
reproduced here due to their extraordinary length; however, each defines rcis as a function of 
the same set of variables. In each case, one solution is positive value, another one is negative 
value, and the rest are in the form of complex numbers. Since cost of equity capital is positive 
value, a positive solution is chosen as an estimate of cost of equity capital. Inputs required for 
the computation are discussed below:
    (a) Price and Book Value of Equity at t=O 
    While closing share price on December 31, 2008 is readily available, firm's book value of 
common equity is not; its value is therefore calculated by adding forecasted earnings (i.e., 
earning per share for the fiscal year ended on December 31, 2008) to reported book value of 
equity from previous one year t=-I (i.e., book value as of December 31, 2007) and subtracting 
forecasted dividends paid. In order words, Fbpso = bps_, + Fepsc - Fdps0, assuming clean 
surplus relation. Closing share price Po and reported book value of equity per share bps_, are 
obtained from Thomson Datastream (Datastream data type: P, WC05476). Forecasted 
earnings and dividend are discussed in later section.
    (b) Forecast of Residual Income 
    The forecast of residual income requires forecasted earning per share (Feps), dividend 
payout ratio (k), forecasted book value of equity per share (Fbps,), and forecasted return on 
equity (Froe), all of which are explained in the following:
S 
I
I
j
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    (b. 1) Forecast Horizon 
    (b.1.1) Explicit forecast period 
    Thomson I/B/E/S database providess consensus of all available individual financial 
analysts' earnings forecasts. So far, the underlying premise is that all analysts' forecasts refer 
to future financial year-end ates.. However, there are cases in which those earnings forecasts 
for the one-year-ahead period refer to a current year. This situation arises as of the following 
reason. I/B/E/S provides monthly consensus forecasts as of the third Thursday of each 
month. To ensure that their forecasts are current, I/B/E/S updates by rolling forward by one 
year the fiscal year-end of all their forecasts in the month when the actual annual earnings are 
announced. For instance, aDecember year-end firm may announce its annual earnings in the 
second week of February of the following year. In response to the announcement, I/B/E/S 
forecasts for that month will be moved to the next financial year. This ensures that one-year-
ahead forecast is always available for the next unannounced fiscal-year end. Therefore, since 
on December 31, 2008, firms have not yet announced their FY 2008 earnings, the one-year-
ahead earnings estimate in I/B/E/S refers to that (current) 2008 financial year-end ate. That 
is, the one-year-ahead earnings forecasts in I/B/E/S as of December 31, 2008 refer to 
earnings forecasts of fiscal year ending on December 31, 2008 to be reported (Fepso), not on 
December 31, 2009 (Feps,). Consequently, Feps, Feps,, Feps3, Feps, corresponds to I/B/E/S 
two-year-ahead, three-year head, four-year ahead, and five-year head earnings forecasts. 
    In short, as of December 31, 2008, earnings forecasts include forecasts for a fiscal year 
ending to be reported (i.e., Feps) and either forecasts for each of the fiscal year ending on 
December 31, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 (i.e., Feps, Feps2, Feps3, and Feps,) or the forecast 
for the fiscal year ending on December 31, 2009 and a forecast of growth in earnings for the 
subsequent three years (i.e., Feps, and g,BES). In effect, we have explicit forecasts for the 
subsequent four years. When available, we use the actual forecasts for each subsequent year, 
and when these forecasts are not available, we use the forecast for 2009 and calculate forecasts 
for 2010 through 2012 using analysts' forecasts of growth in earnings. These values are 
generated by projecting that growth rate in earnings on the prior year's earnings forecasts. In 
other words, 
                      Feps, =Feps,+ abs(Feps,) xg,BEs 
                      Feps3 =Feps,+ abs(Feps,) xg,BEs 
                      Feps, = Feps3 + abs (Feps) x grBEs 
where absQ refers to absolute value
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    Correspondently, we choose to collect median value of all earnings forecasts for Fepso, 
Feps, , Feps2, Feps3 and Feps4 (I/B/E/S Data type: F1MD, F2MD, F3MD, F4MD, and FWD), 
as well as median value of long-term anticipated annual growth rate in earnings over a five 
year period gees (I/B/E/S Data type: LTMD) as of December 31, 2008. These earnings 
forecasts together with dividend payout ratio (k) are used to correspondently generate each 
forecasted book values of equity and return on equity (Fbps, and Froe, where t=1 to 4), all of 
which are elaborated in subsequent section.
    (b.1.2) Implicit Forecast Period 
    Froe, after four-year ahead cannot be explicitly computed since its component, earnings 
forecasts, from that period are not provided by financial analysts. Froe, as a result are 
implicitly estimated, based on its mean-reverting behavior. In order words, the behavior of 
return on equity capital is characterized as a mean-reverting process: firms with above-
average and below-average rate of return on equity capital tend to revert over time to a normal 
(average) level within no more than ten years (Palepu and Healy 2007; Penman 1992). 
Consistent with Gebhardt, I-ee, and Swaminathan (2001), we assume that ROE is mean-
reverting over time. In particular, we assume that forecasted ROES mean revert toward the 
median ROE of the industry over the period of 10 years. We therefore forecast five-year head 
ROES onwards (Froe, , t=5 to 9) implicitly by mean-reverting each firms' four-year ahead ROES 
(Froe4) to the industry median ROE by period ten (t= 10). This mean-reversion can be 
achieved via simple linear interpolation between four-year ahead ROE and ten-year ahead 
industry median ROE. That is, if forecasted ROE in four-year ahead is higher (lower) than 
industry median ROE in ten-year ahead, forecasted ROES after four-year ahead falls (rises) at 
a constant rate each year, reverting to the industry median ROE. 
    To compute forecasted industry ROE, we group all stocks into the forty-industry 
classification based on Industrial classification benchmark (1CB). Since the industry target 
ROE is not observable, historical industry median ROE is used as a proxy. Ten years of past 
ROES (i.e., from period t = -10 to period t -1) are employed to compute this median. Since 
loss is temporary for a going concern and consistent with Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
(2001), we exclude loss-making firms on the basis that the population of profit making firms 
better reflects long-term industry equilibrium ROE in computing median industry ROE. 
Return on equity capital is obtained from Thomson Datastream (Datastream datatype: 
WC08301). 
    (b.2) Terminal Value
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    We further assume that from ten-year ahead (t=10) to infinity, residual income will be the 
same as that of year ten and will remain infinitely constant. This does not imply that earnings 
do not grow after ten-year ahead. Rather it assumes that any growth in earnings after that is 
value neutral.
    (b.3) Dividend payout ratio (k) 
    An estimate of the dividend payout ratio is required for the computation of future book 
value of equity. We assume that firms maintain its, dividend payout policies; that is, it will be 
sustained in the future. A firm-specific dividend payout ratio (k) is defined as an average of its 
dividend payout ratio in the last ten years. Dividend payout ratio is obtained from Thomson 
Datastream (Datastream datatype: WC09504).
    (b.4) Future book value of common equity 
    Based on the concept of clean surplus accounting, forecasted book value of equity can be 
estimated by adding forecasted earnings to previous-year forecasted book value of equity, and 
subtracting forecasted dividend paid. In order words, Fbps, = Fbps,., + Feps, -Fdps,. By 
assuming that current dividend payout ratio (k) will be sustained in the future, forecasted 
book value of equity can derived from the following equation. 
    Fbpso = bps., + (1-k) x Fepso 
    Fbps, = Fbpso + (1-k) x Feps, or Fbps, = [1 + (1-k) x Froe,] x Fbpso 
    Fbps2 =Fbps, + (1-k) x Feps2 or Fbps2 = [1 + (1-k) x Froe2] x Fbps, 
    Fbps, = Fbpst_, + (1-k) x Feps, or Fbps, = [I + (I-k) x Froe,] x Fbps,_, 
    3.2.2.3 Control variables 
    Existing researches suggest that cost of equity capital is negatively related to firm size 
(MV), and positively related to book-to-price ratio (B/P), market beta (BETA), financial 
leverage (LEV), and earnings variability (EVAR) (Fama and French (1995); Berk (1995); 
Modigliani and Miller (1958)). It also suggests that cost of equity capital varies between 
industries (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), Ahn et al. (2008)).
    3.2.2.4 Regression model 
    Hypothesis 2 can be examined through a multiple linear regression mod 
the following equation, hereafter eferred to as equation two (E2).
el expressed by
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rr., s, _ /3o+# i log(SPREAD;) +/32 1og(MV,1) +/33 B/P; + /3 4 BETA; + /35 log(LEK, ) 
               +/351og(EVAR;)+ s                     ~r1S;INDUST;+e, (E2)
3.3 Sample Selection 
    Our sample of firms consists of all U.S companies with December fiscal-year end, 
covered by I/B/E/S database as of December 31, 2008 and is further limited by the availability 
of data to compute relevant dependent, independent and control variables. In short, we include 
observations that fulfill the following requirements: 
    (1) I/B/E/S covered firms with fiscal year ending on December 31. 
    (2) Data availability and restriction to compute relevant dependent and independent 
      variables. 
    (3) Data availability to compute relevant control variables. 
    Fulfilling the above requirements, thefinal sample is 2,106 firm-observations for 
hypothesis 1, and 1,700 firm-observations for hypothesis 2.
i
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Empirical analyses on hypothesis one (H1) 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics and Regression Result 
    Table 4.1 and 4.2 present both descriptive statistics of equation one (El)'s variables and 
its Pearson correlation coefficients. In our sample, the number of financial analysts following a
firm (ANF) range from two analysts to thirty seven analysts with median of six analysts. This 
suggests there are substantial variation i  the value of independent variable, which satisfies 
one of the assumption of classical linear regression model, which requires that independent 
variable must vary to some extent (Gujarati 2003). Table 4.2 exhibits list-wise Pearson 
correlation coefficients among regression variables. Overall, bid-ask spread (SPREAD) is 
correlated with independent and control variables with the expected sign, and its correlation 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. Expectedly, it exhibitss a negative correlation 
with the numbers of financial analysts (ANF), suggesting that firms with many financial 
analysts coverage have small bid-ask spread. In addition, it posits a negative correlation with 
firm size (MV), percentages of share free float (FLOAT), average share price (P), and positive 
correlation with dispersion i  analyst earnings forecast (FDISP).
F
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    Table 4.3 presents regression results of equation one (EI) where outliers are excluded 
using Cook's distance statistic, and standard errors are computed using White's (1980) 
method. Empirical studies employing regression analysis of cross-sectional data often face the 
problem of heteroscedasticity of the error, terms. By far, the most important consequence is 
that interval estimation and hypothesis testing can no longer be trusted, which calls into 
question the reliability of statistical inference (Gujarati, 2003, p. 427). In order words, 
heteroscedasticity does not bias the coefficient estimates but it does bias the standard errors 
of those coefficients. Testing the regression's residuals for heteroscedasticity using the 
Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg methods suggests that heteroscedasticity is likely to be a 
problem in the case at hand. To account for it, we use t-statistics based on White's (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (Robust Standard Error) in the significant ests.
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for regression variables of equation one (El)
Mean Std. Dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max
SPREAD 
ANF 
FDISP 
MV 
FLOAT 
P
   0.013 0.037 
  7.258 5.266 
 21.075 288.191 
3394.643 14639.358 
 78.314 17.737 
 63.103 2143.910
0.001 
2.000 
0.000 
2.620 
12.000 
0.063
 0.002 
 3.000 
  1.563 
161.140 
70.000 
  4.332
  0.004 
 6.000 
  3.535 
502.030 
82.000 
 11.363
  0.010 1.164 
 10.000 37.000 
  9.091 12400.000 
1773.240 406067.000 
 92.000 100.000 
 22.570 98398.258
i
Observations 2106
Table 4.2 Pearson correlation coefficients for regression variable of equation one (El)
log(SPREAD) log(ANF) log(FDISP) log(MV) iog(FLOA7) log(p)
log(SPREAD) 
log(ANF) 
Iog(FDISP) 
log(MV) 
log(FLOA7) 
log(P)
1 
0.115*** 
-0 .770*** 
-0.164*** 
-0.749***
1 
 0.0430* 
 0.640*** 
0.0831 *** 
 0.434***
1 
-0 .0726-
 -0.0448* 
 -0 .139***
1 
0.179**° 
0.776***
1 
0.138*** 1
Observations 2106
*p < 0,05, **p <0.01,***p <0.001
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      Table 4.3 Cross-sectional regression of equation one (El) 
log (SPREAD,) _ /3 0 +,3, log (ANF) )+,3z l og (FDI SP;) + P3 1 og (MV, ) 
               +p, log(FLOAT,) + p,, log(P) + e, (EI)
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient
Robust 
Std. Error
t-Statistics p-value
Ibg(ANF) 
log(FDISP) 
109M' 
log(FLOA7) 
log(P) 
Constant
-0 .230*** 
0.024*** 
-0.184*** 
-0.050 
-0 .427*** 
-2.608***
0.023 
0.005 
0.014 
0.045 
0.017 
0.189
-10 .10 
4.92 
-13.53 
-1 .12 
-24 .64 
-13 .77
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.262 
0.000 
0.000
Observations 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F
1974 
0.723 
0.722 
1016.9
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
log () is a natural logarithm of variable; SPREAD is the average of daily spreads, the difference between bid and 
ask prices, divided by the average of bid and ask for December 2008; ANF is the numbers of earnings forecasts 
made by financial nalysts for that financial year ending on December 31, 2008; FDISP is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of all the forecasts to absolute value of mean value of all those forecasts; MV is market value of common 
equities of firms at the end of the year 2008; FLOAT is the average of daily percentage of the total numbers of 
shares outstanding of a firm that is available for trading by the investing publics and is not held for strategic goals 
for December 2008; and P is the average of daily share pricee of a firm for December 2008
i
4.1.2 Regression Assumptions 
    To check robustness of our result, we examine the assumptions of OLS regression. We 
first examine normality of regression's residual. Normality of residuals is only required for 
valid hypothesis testing in that it assures p-values for the t-tests and F-test will be valid. It is 
not required to obtain unbiased estimates of regression coefficients. In other words, normality 
assumption of residuals enables us to derive the probability, or sampling distributions of 
regression coefficients to be normally distributed, which simplifies the task of establishing 
confidence intervals and testing statistical hypotheses (Gujarati, 2003, p. 112). Normality is 
however a concern only when the size of the sample is small. Since, our sample size is 
relatively large, the distribution of regression coefficients are shown to be asymptotically 
normal. In other words, normality of regression error terms is of less concern when the 
sample size is large. However, as a robustness check, we further employ bootstrapping 
method, which can estimate regression coefficients' standard errors and thus confidence 
intervals when the residuals may not be distributed normally or even approximately normally
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(Kennedy 2008). Bootstrap method begins by first estimating the regression model (El) and 
saving the residuals. It then performs a Monte Carlo procedure, using the estimated 
parameter values (regression coefficients) as the "true" parameter values and the actual 
values of the independent variables as the fixed independent variable values. During this 
Monte Carlo study, residuals are first drawn with replacement from the set of original 
residuals; a new set of dependent variable values are then computed; and new regression 
coefficients are estimated. Replicating this procedure for 5,000 times enables us to estimate 
sampling distributions of regression coefficients and thus estimate their standard errors, 
known as bootstrapped standard errors. The result (not shown) shows that most of t-statistics 
of our variables are smaller when standard errors are computed using bootstrapping method, 
suggesting regression coefficients are less likely to be significant. In particular, although 
t-statistics of our variables of interests are smaller when standard errors are estimated using 
bootstrapping method, it still remains statistically and significantly different from zero. Next, 
multicollinearity among explanatory variables makes the estimation of regression coefficients 
difficult and its standard errors large. Myers (1990) suggests that a variance inflation factor 
(VIP) value of 10 or more causes a concern of multicollinearity. In our sample, we check the 
value of VIF of each regression variables, and no VIE value is greater than 3.69, suggesting 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem.
i 
i
4.1.3 Supplementary Analyses 
    We additionally run various regression specifications by including other variables that 
might be related to bid-ask spread in order to check if the conclusion remains qualitatively the 
same. 
    First, with a concern that bid-ask spread may be different among the stock exchanges 
where firms are listed, we include three dummy variables for four categories: New York Stock 
Exchange, NASDAQ, AMEX, and others, The result suggests that our conclusion remains 
qualitatively the same. Next, in addition to earnings forecast dispersions, forecasts errors 
(FEROR) might also be used as a proxy for information precision. That is, if analysts provide 
expected earnings forecast with low accuracy, precision of investors expectation about the 
firm's future earnings is also low (Francis, Olsson, and Schipper 2006; Mansi, Maxwell, and 
Miller 2007). Forecast error (FERROR), defined as the difference between consensus analyst 
earnings forecasts and actual forecasts scaled by actual forecasts, is included as additional 
control variable. The result reveals that FERROR is not statistically and significantly different 
from zero, and log(ANF) still remains statistically and significantly different from zero. Finally,
i
-77-
Financial Analysts' Coverage and Cost of Equity Capital
rather than using transformation form of ANF (i.e., log(ANF)), we instead use its original form 
(i.e., ANF) and conclusionn of our result is insensitive to this alternative form. In sum, our 
conclusion remains qualitatively the same regardless of various regression specifications.
4.2 Empirical analyses on hypothesis two (H2) 
4.2.1 Summary Statistics and Regression Result 
    Descriptive statistics for regression variables as well as its Pearson correlation 
coefficients of equation two (E2)are presented in Table 4.4 and 4.5. Firms' expected cost of 
equity capital (rcis), estimated on December 31, 2008, range from approximately 4.7% at 1 
percentile to 34.2% at 99 percentile with its 12.7% (11.5%) mean (median). Importantly, Table 
4.5 suggests that expected cost of equity capital (rots) increases in bid-ask spread (SPREAD), 
It correspondently accords with theoretical models arguing that high level of adverse 
selections translates into high expected cost of equity capital for a firm. Moreover, as 
expected, rots is decreasing in firm size, and increasing in book-to-price ratio, market beta, 
financial everage, and earnings variability. All of correlation coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. Table 4.6 presents regression result of equation two (E2) where outliers 
are excluded using Cook's Distance statistics, standard errors are computed using White's 
(1980) method, and outputs of regression coefficients of 9 INDUST variables are suppressed. 
First, the overall model is highly significant with R-square (adjusted R-square) of 63% (62.7%). 
This adjusted k-square is similar to prior empirical studies investigating the determinants of
cross-sectional difference in implied cost of equity capital estimates (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee, and 
Swaminathan (2001); Ahn et al. (2008)). 
    Second, avalid estimate of cost of equity capital should be related with well-known risk 
factors uch as market beta and additional risk factors including firm size and book-to-price 
ratio as suggested by Fama and French (1995). In our result, rcL5 is expectedly increasing in 
both BETA and B/P, and decreasing in log(MV) with its significantly non-zero correlation 
coefficients, suggesting that our estimated cost of equity capital be valid. 
    Last but not least, taking common well-known risk factors of rccs into account, 
regression coefficients of log (SPREAD) is expectedly positive, and significantly different from 
zero. All regression coefficients of other variables have the expected signs and are 
significantly different from zero. In sum, the result suggests that, after controlling for common 
risk factors affecting expected cost of equity capital, firms with high level of bid-ask spreads 
have high expected cost of equity capital.
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4.2.2 Regression Assumptions 
    As in the case of equation one (El), we further use bootstrapping method in order to 
estimate regression coefficients' standard errors and confidence intervals, assuming that the 
normality of residuals' assumption does not hold. The result suggests that, despite changes in 
t-statistics; the significances ofregression coefficients remain unchanged. In particular, cas is 
increasing with log(SPREAD). Next, we inspect individual inflation factor (VIF) of each 
regression variables. In our sample, no VIF value of any explanatory variables i  greater than 
2.59, suggesting that multicollineary"is unlikely to be a concern.
4.2.3 Supplementary Analyses 
    4.2.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
    We earlier estimate expected cost of equity capital using forecast horizon of 10 years by 
assuming ROE mean-reverts within ten years. To check if the conclusion of the result is 
sensitive to this assumption, we additionally estimate expected cost of equity capital using 
forecast horizon of 12, 15, and 20 years and re-run our regression. The result (not presented) 
shows that the means of implied cost of equity capital estimates among various scenarios have 
very little differences (e.g., 12.9% with 10-year ROE mean-revert assumption and 12.8% with 
12-year ROE mean-revert assumption), and in particular, our conclusion remains the same 
regardless of the alternative cost of equity capital estimates.
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics for regression variables of equation two (E2)
Mean Std. Error 1% 25 Median 75 99
rcis 
SPREAD 
MV 
B/P 
BETA 
LEV 
EVAR
  0.128 
  0.011 
3982.220 
   1.081 
   1.147 
  0.002 
   4.366
   0.057 
   0.025 
15907.366 
   1.816 
   0.439 
   0.009 
   79.403
0.047 
0.001 
13.805 
-0 .166 
0.266 
0.000 
0.039
 0.092 
  0.002 
209.010 
  0.451 
  0.832 
  0.000 
  0.288
  0.115 
  0.003 
661.830 
 0.742 
  1.113 
 0.000 
  0.515
   0.146 0.342 
  0.007 0.118 
2202.130 69980.469 
   1.190 8.056 
   1.438 2.243 
  0.001 0.026 
   1.021 16.321
Observations 1700
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Table 4.5 Pearson correlation coefficients for regression variables of equation two (E2)
Mean log(SPREAD) log(MV) B/P BETA log(LEV) log(EVAR)
rGLS 
log(SPREAD) 
log(MV) 
B/P 
BETA 
log(LEV) 
log(EVAR)
1 
0.463*** 
-0.359*** 
0.453*** 
0.262*"* 
0.364*** 
0.174***
1 
-0 .740*** 
0.328*** 
 0.0388 
0.212*** 
-0.110***
1 
-0 .266*** 
 -0.0236 
 -0 .0135 
0.142***
1 
0.103*** 
0.240*** 
 0.0122
1 
0.172**" 
0.184***
1 
0.144*** 1
Observations 1700
*p<0 .05,**P<0.01,***p<0.001
            Table 4.6 Cross-sectional regression of equation two (E2) 
yc,s = /30+$, log (SPREAD,) +0z log(MV1) + f,, B/P; + /34 BETA; + /3,5 log (LEV; ) 
                     +f 6 log(EVAR;) + r1-1 b, INDUST; +e, (E2)
Variables
Expected 
 Sign
Coefficients
Robust 
Sid. Error
t-Statistics p-value
log(SPREAD) 
log(MV) 
B/P 
BETA 
log(LEVJ 
log(EVAR) 
Constant 
INDUST (Included)
4
0.007*** 
-0.003*** 
0.015*** 
0.017*** 
0.005*** 
0.005*** 
0.186***
0.001 
0.001 
0.002 
0.002 
0.001 
0.001 
0.015
4.99 
-4.38 
7.94 
9.07 
7.42 
6.40 
12.65
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000
Observations 
R* 
Adjusted R2 
F
1620 
0.630 
0.627 
139.7
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
log (.) is a natural logarithm of variable; rGLS is cost of equity capital estimates under GLS (2001) method; 
SPREAD is the average of daily spreads, the difference between bid and ask prices divided by the average of bid 
and ask for December 2008; MV is market value of common equities of firms at the end of the year 2008; B/P is 
book value of common equity to price ratio at the end of the year 2008; BETA is market beta at the end of the 
year 2008; LEV is financial leverage defined as the ratio of debts to firm's market value of common equity at the 
end of the year 2008; EVAR is standard eviation of annual earnings for the past five years; and INDUST is 9 
indicatorvariable(s) based on industry classification benchmark (1CI3) code.
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Table 4.7 Comparative Regression Results using Various Cost of Equity Capital Methods
GLS CT MOJ OJ MPEG PE AVG
log(SPREAD)
Iog(Mt9
B/P
BETA
log(LEt7
log(EVAR)
Constant 
INDUSTs
0.00672""' 
   (4.99) 
-0.00294*** 
   (-4.38) 
 0.0152'"' 
    (7.94) 
 0.0167"'" 
   (9.07) 
0.00480'** 
   (7.42) 
0.00465"'* 
   (6.40) 
  0.186''" 
  (12.65)
0.00897**" 
   (4.87) 
 -0.00124 
   (-1.38) 
 0.0104*"" 
   (6.89) 
 0.0196*** 
   (6.88)
0.00566***
  (8.01) 
0.00271** 
  (2.66) 
 0.187'"" 
 (14,72)
0.00880*** 
   (5.15) 
-0.000814 
   (-0.93) 
0.00807'*' 
   (5.38) 
0.0180'"" 
   (6.87)
0.00248-
  (3.75) 
0.00193* 
  (2.37) 
0.172'*' 
 (14.99)
 0.0162*** 
   (6.44) 
 -0.00193 
   (-1.57) 
0.0102-
   (4.38) 
 0.0318*** 
   (8.10) 
0.00602""" 
   (6.42) 
 0.00233 
   (1.93) 
 0.247"* 
  (14.47)
 0.0167-
   (6.55) 
-0.00351** 
   (-2.90) 
0.00980*'" 
   (4.45) 
 0.0327'""
(8.24)
0.00531***
  (5.63) 
0.00322' 
  (2.53) 
0.247*" 
 (14.48)
0.00999**" 
   (4.84) 
 -0.00203 
   (-1.78) 
0.0126"* 
   (6.86) 
0.0146*** 
   (4.22)
0.00865***
(10.43)
0.007B1***
 (6.99) 
0.220-
(16.54)
0.00781 *"' 
   (4.82) 
-0.00243"" 
   (-3.14) 
0.0146"" 
   (7.86) 
0.0244'"' 
   (9.40)
0.00516'*'
(8.40)
0.00364-
 (3.56) 
0.183'"' 
(16.01)
Observations 
R' 
Adjusted R'
1620 
0.630 
0.627
1536 
0.341 
0.335
1393 
0.237 
0.228
1438 
0.340 
0.333
1442 
0.359 
0.352
1832 
0.303 
0.298
1198 
0.516 
0.510
tstatistics in parentheses 
* p< 0.05,**p< 0.01,***p <0.001
E
    4.2.3.2 Alternative accounting-based cost of equity capital estimates 
    Despite prior empirical evidences uggesting that implied cost of equity capital from the 
residual income valuation model outperforms that from the abnormal earnings growth 
valuation model (e.g., Gode and Mohanram (2003); Ahn et al. (2008)), there is still no 
consensus in favor of particular model. Therefore, if our results are valid, a statistically 
significant link between bid-ask spread and implied cost of equity capital should be 
documented not only with GLS (2001) method but also other various methods, assuming that 
these methods produce valid cost of equity capital estimates. 
    We thus repeat our tests on different cost of equity capital estimates from various well-
known methods documented in literature, all of which are derived from either residual income 
or abnormal earnings growth model. We label rCr as the estimate of implied cost of equity 
capital from Claus and Thomas (2001) method; roe as that from Gode and Mohanram (2003) 
and Ohlson and Jeuttner-Nauroth (2005) method; rvof as that from our additional specification 
from Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) method; r, as that from price-earnings ratio
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method; rM nc as that from Easton (2004) method; and finally r,rc as that from average of these 
methods"). 
   The estimates of cost of equity capital from these methods range from a mean of 11.8% 
for rcr to a mean of 15.7% for roe. Table 4.7 presents the result of regressing costs of equity 
capitals estimated from various methods on our variable of interest SPREAD, where outliers 
are excluded using Cook's Distance statistics, and standard errors are computed using White's 
(1980) method. The overall models of each regression are highly significant. As expected, the 
adjusted R-square of a model when cost of equity capital is implied using GLS (2001) is 
highest, and this is consistent with prior studies documenting that GLS (2001) method is 
superior to others. The coefficients of log(SPREAD) are shown to be positively related to 
each cost of equity capital estimates and are significantly different from zero. All other 
variables, when statistically and significantly different from zero, have the expected signs. In 
sum, the results uggest that a positive relationship between bid-ask spread and cost of equity 
capital persist, regardless of the methods used, and thus additionally confirm our above-
documented results.
5. Conclusion
    This research studies whether firms with higher number of financial analysts' coverage 
have lower expected cost of equity capital, motivated from existing theoretical models which 
argue that information reduces a firm's cost of equity capital by reducing adverse selection 
component of information asymmetry. Our result suggests that firms with higher numbers of 
financial analysts' coverage have smaller bid-ask spreads which in turns have lower expected 
cost of equity capitals. Our empirical results support adverse-selection/market liquidity 
theoretical models.
[Notes] 
(1) Issues of using theory-based models when examining a link between i formation a d cost of capital. 
   The reason this paper uses accounting-based estimates when examining the relationship between 
   information a d cost of equity capital is that theory-based stimates (e.g., CAPM) are not useful in this 
   purpose. These points are raised, for example, by Botosan (2006), which states that, -
        "Whether stimated using the CAPM or some other multifactor model, the resulting cost of equity
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capital estimates are not useful to empiricists investigating the link between disclosure and cost of 
equity capital. Because these models assume that the priced risk factors are known and limited to the 
factors in the model, the nature of the empirical relation between disclosure and cost of equity capital 
is preordained. If the model does not include disclosure related risk as a priced risk factor, the 
relevant question becomes whether disclosure is related to any of the factors that are in the model. 
For example, since the CAPM limits the risk factors to market beta, disclosure can impact cost of 
equity capital only if it impacts market beta. But, the hypothesis that more disclosure reduces market 
beta enjoys little theoretical support."
i
        Table 4.5 in the paper shows that he correlation between Beta, which is the only priced risk factor 
   in CAPM, and bid-ask spread is not statistically significant. This correlation suggests hat Beta may not 
   capture information-related risks, and thus not useful in this purpose of study. 
(2) Alternative cost of equity capital method 
   (a) Claus and Thomas (2001) method 
       A method implemented by Claus and Thomas (2001) is different from that by Gebhardt, Lee, and 
   Swaminathan (2001) in terms of perpetual growth assumption in estimating terminal value. Specifically, 
   expected cost of equity capital can be implied from the following equation: 
                P,=Fbps1+y, (Fepse-rcrk Flips, -r)+ (Fepsn->c-rx Fbpss) x (l+g) 
                         r-i (1+rc-r)' (r-g) x(l+rcr)4 
   Where: 
        r,, is the cost of equity capital under CT method. All other input except gare previously defined, g 
   is the growth rate of residual income in perpetuity, assumed tobe equal to the expected inflation rate. In 
   particular, CT assume that growth in residual income will be at the rate of inflation, estimated as the 
   nominal risk-free rate minus the real risk-free rate (estimated to be 3%). Emprically, growth in residual 
   income beyond forecast horizon is10 years government'F-bond yield minus 3%. (i.e., r1-3%). We also use 
   the ten-year government T-bond rate at the date of estimation to proxy for the risk-free rate. However, it is 
   unrealistic touse 3% as an estimate ofreal-risk free rate since real risk free rate varies over time. In 1997, 
   the U.S. Treasury began issuing indexed bonds, which payments linked to inflation, also known as 
  Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS) since payments including the principal re tied to inflation. 
  To date, the Treasury has issued these indexed bonds, ranging from 5 to 20 years. The yield on this 
   shortest-term bond therefore provides a good estimate for the real risk-free rate, since it has essentially no 
  risk (Ehrhardt and Brigham 2009).
(b) Ohlson and Jeuttner-Nauroth (2005) method 
     Ohlson and Jeuttner-Nauroth (2005) method equates the value of a 
earnings per share and the future abnormal growth in earnings per share. 
the following: 
                      roj -A + A- 2 Fepsr ( Feps2-Fepsi 
                                 Po Pepsi
-g3_
firm with capitalized next-period 
Its finite horizon version is as of
I 
4 
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Where: 
  2 ~ A_ ~g+Fdps, 
P r0J is cost of equity capital under Of method and all other variables are defined previously. 
(c) Price-Earnings Ratios (Special case of Ohlson and JeuttnerNauroth (2005) model 
     Cost of equity capital is estimated as the inverse of the forward PE ratio. That is, 
Yrr =1... 
     PE,a' 
Where: 
      eps, 
rr is cost of equity capital under Price-Earnings ratio and all other variables are defined previously. 
(d) Modified Price-Earnings Growth method 
     Easton (2004) derives a restricted version of Ohlson and Jeuttner-Nauroth (2005) model. Under the 
assumption of zero dividends and zero growth in abnormal earnings, expected cost of equity capital can be 
obtained from the following expression: 
                                     Fepsz-Feps, 
                             r.".
P
Where: 
rMPGG is cost of equity capital under modified Price-Earnings Growth method and all other variables are 
defined previously. 
(e). Our modified Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) method 
    We derive additional specification from the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) method. Their 
method assumes that z2 grows perpetuity with a constant rate g where it can be algebraically simplified into 
a second order polynomial equation. However, their method does not employ all information in financial 
analysts' earnings forecasts including long-term growth forecasts. Instead, we explicitly forecast abnormal 
earnings growth from z, to z4, and assume that z4 grows perpetuity at a constant rate g. Its equation is 
expressed as of the following: 
    eps, z2 Z z4 Z40 +g) z4(I+g)2 
    rMOJ rmaj(I + rMoJ)' rMOJ(ll + rMoJ)2 YMOJ(I + rMoj)' rwoj(1 + ra0J)4 rMOJ(I + rMof)5 
Above equation is algebraically equal to: 
     eps, Z'2 z5 24 24(1+g) P
u- 
rMOJ + rMOJ(i + rM01)' + rMof(1 + rMoj) + rMOJ(1 + rMoJ)' + rvoJ(enoi- g) (1 + rMOJ)2 
Where: z, = eps, - epsa, - rmo1(eps,, - tips,,) and rMoJ is cost of equity capital under modified Of method. All 
other variables are defined previously. 
(/) Combined cost of equity capital estimates 
     Given the strengths and weaknesses of individual methods to estimate afirm-specific ost of equity 
capital, it seems reasonable to assume that the combinations of the existing methods could possibly
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provide better results. We thus average all six methods, referred to as r,
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